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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STANDARD OPTICAL
C O M P A N Y , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent.

I
I
) Case No.

STANDARD OPTICAL
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
L A W R E N C E A. J O N E S , as Salt
Lake City Auditor, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

13924

I
I

\

RESPONDENT, SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATIONS BRIEF

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
The plaintiff-appellants commenced two separate
actions challenging the validity of a Salt Lake City
special improvement district, created pursuant to the
provisions of Section 10-16-1 et seq., Utah Code AnnoI
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tated 1953. They have challenged the jurisdictional and
procedural aspects of that improvement district and
seek to have the same declared void and enjoin further
work on the project.
D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT
After consolidating the two above enumerated
cases, the lower court on August 19, 1974, partially
granted defendant-respondent, Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment; subsequently, on an expedited hearing, held September 10, 1974, the lower
court received testimony concerning the validity of the
contract between the City and Gibbons and Reed.
Thereafter, in a memorandum decision the lower court
ruled that the special improvement district was validly
created pursuant to law in every respect and that the
contract between Salt Lake City and Gibbons and
Reed was valid.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Salt Lake City as defendant-respondents, seek to
have this court affirm the decision of the lower court
and dismiss the appeal, awarding costs to the defendants-respondents.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as shown by the affidavits, the Findings
of Fact of the lower court and the matters of record are
as follows:

2
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1. For approximately eleven (11) years prior to
1973, the Salt Lake City Commission had been considering a special improvement district concerning the
area subject of the within litigation. They had appointed an ad hoc citizens committee for the purpose
of considering what configuration such an improvement
district should take. (Deposition of Mayor Jake Garn
at p. 4; Affidavit of Mayor Jake Garn, R-33; Affidavit of City Engineer, Joseph Fenton, R-83).
2. On or about December 4, 1973, the City Engineer submitted to the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners, a cost estimate of the proposal, which proposal was approved by said Board. The City Attorney was directed to prepare a Notice of Intention
for the creation of a special improvement district. (R110).
3. On or about December 18, 1973, a Notice of
Intention to create said district was prepared by the
City Attorney. I t was thereafter submitted to and approved by the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners.
As relevant to this appeal, said Notice of Intention,
among other things, provided that:
a. The purpose for the assessment was:
"To remove all existing curbs, gutters, sidewalks and street paving and to construct new
street paving, pedesfcran'?.nd planting, cu^b
and gutters, together with new sir et lighting
and draining structures, °nd to do all other
work necessary to complete the project in

3
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accordance with Salt Lake City standards."
*

#

*

"All other necessary things shall be done to
complete the whole project in a proper and
workmanlike manner according to the plans,
profiles, and specifications on file in the office of the Salt Lake City Engineer . . ."
b. The nature of the improvements was to install and construct new curbs, gutters, sidewalks and street paving, 2%ether with pedestrian paving, landscape structures, planters and planting materials. Also new street
lighting and draining structures would be
constructed, together with those more specific items and alterations on file as plans,
profiles and specifications in the Salt Lake
City Engineer's Office.
c. Described the boundaries of the district as
that area of blocks, 57, 58, 69, 70, 75 and 76
of Plat A of Salt Lake City Survey, within
the area of South Temple Street on the North
and Third South Street on the South, and
between State Street on the East and West
Temple Street on the West.
d. The estimated cost of the project was $2,875,189.75, as determined by the Salt Lake City
Engineer's estimate. The property owners
would be charged and assessed a sum not to
exceed said $505.00 per front foot. The City
would pay the balance of the costs estimated
to be $872,405.20.
e. Protests should be filed on or before January 16, 1974, and that on the 17th day of Jan4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nary, 1974, the Board would consider such
protests and objections that had been made.
(R-57-58); see, notice printed as 1- appendix.
4. The aforesaid Notice of Intention was published in the Deseret News, a newspaper of general
circulation in Salt Lake City and within the County of
Salt Lake, once a week for four (4) successive weeks.
Said publications were on December 20, December 27,
January 3, and January 10, which last publication date
was at least five (5) days, but not more than twenty
(20) days prior to the time fixed in the Notice as the
last day for filing protests. (Affidavit of City Recorder, Herman Hogensen, R-51).
5. On December 26, 1973, the Notice of Intention
was mailed, postage prepaid to the registered owner of
each lot, parcel, plot or real property located within
the proposed Special Improvement District. (Affidavit
of City Recorder Herman Hogensen, R-51).
6. On January 17, 1974, at a regularly scheduled
meeting of the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners,
said Commission received all of the written protests
filed and referred them to the Salt Lake City Engineers Office and to City Attorney and to the Planning
and Zoning Department for report and tabulation.
Further, at said meeting, every person present was
given an opportunity to protest and state his objections;
however, it was recommended that a further meeting be
held, after a complete tabulation of the protests. ("3?-
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fidavit of City Recorder Herman Hogensen, R-52;
Deposition of Mayor Jake Gam, p. 22).
7. On January 18, 1974, a notice was sent to each
registered property owner and protester within the proposed Special Improvement District No. 480, requesting their attendance at a meeting to be held January 25,
1974, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. in the Salt Lake City Commission Chambers. The purpose of the meeting was to
discuss said proposed improvement district and to hear
any and all further comments thereon. Further, notice
of said meeting and its time, place and topic for discussion was published in the Deseret News on January 21,
1974. (Affidavit of Mayor Jake Garn, R-35, R-39).
8. On or about January 22, 1974, tabulation of the
protest showed that protests representing substantially
less than two-thirds of the property to be assesed had
been received; to-wit: 49.15% of those protests of record
property owners, or if, three questionable protests were
counted, 51.23%. (R-35, 36).
9. On January 25, 1974, the previously announced
meeting was held in the Salt Lake City Commission
Chambers. This meeting was a continuation of the
previous January 17, 1974 hearing and was held as per
the Notice mailed January 18, 1974. Further, there
was wide public publicity of the said January 25, 1974
meeting in the public news media. There were more
persons present at this meeting than were present at
the January 17, 1974 meeting. A full discussion was

6
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had before the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners,
wherein all who desired to speak were given opportunity
to speak against or for the proposal. All of the plaintiff-appellants received notice of this January 25, 1974
meeting and all were either present in person or represented at this meeting. (Deposition of Mayor Jake
Gam at p. 27; Affidavit of Mayor Jake Garn, R-36);
Stipulation of Facts, R-55).
10. After said meeting of January 25, 1974, numerous previous protesters withdrew their protests and if
these withdrawals are considered, the percentage of those
protesting was reduced to 44.4%. (R-152).
11. On or about February 13, 1974, the Board of
Salt Lake City Commissioners approved a Notice to
Contractors requesting the submission of bids, which
Notice was published in a newspaper having general
circulation in Salt Lake City, February 14, 1974, and
solicited bids for an opening March 7, 1974. Further,
on said date, the Board approved the project plans and
specifications of the architect, Barton-Aschman. (Findings of Fact No. 1, R-42; Affidavit of City Recorder
Herman Hogensen, R-52). Said publication date was
more than fifteen (15) days prior to the date specified
for the receipt of bids. Said bids were received and
duly opened and referred to the City Engineer and the
City Attorney for determination of the lowest responsible bidder. (R-52).
12. The date of the bid opening was duly post-

7
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poned, and bids were opened March 21, 1974. Findings
of F a c t N o . 2,11-42).
13. T w o bids were received, both on a "line item"
basis. Schocker Construction Company bid a total price
of $4,771,581.95, and Gibbons and Reed Company, $4,123,254.15. T h e Gibbons and Reed bid was $648,327.80
lower t h a n t h a t of Schocker Construction Company, but
$1,248,064.40 higher than the %$0%& estimate of $2,875,189.75. (Findings of F a c t N o . 3, R - 4 2 ) .
14. Because of the City's express guarantee to
the property owners concerning their cost being limited
to $505 per front foot, and difference between the estimated (and budgeted) amount, and the lowest bid, the
City, with the assistance of its consulting architects, investigated the possibility of eliminating some of the
proposed improvements. (Findings of F a c t N o . 6, R43).
15. I t was determined that the project could be
brought within the City's budget by making certain
deletions, that the deletions would have no adverse
effects on the aesthetics of the project, and that the
project as modified would have the same general effect
as originally intended. This determination was based
upon substantial facts before the City Commission and
upon the opinion of the consulting architects. (Findings
of F a c t N o . 7 , R - 4 3 ) .
16. I n connection with the proposed revisions to
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the contract, the City caused to be prepared a "Target
Vitality" summary sheet, dated April 4, 1974, which
contained possible revisions to the lowest base bid which,
as therein summarized, would reduce the cost from $4,123,254.15 to $2,834,766.21. (Findings of Fact No. 8,
R-43).
17. On April 9, 1974, a notice of a meeting to be
held April 16, 1974, in Salt Lake City Commission
Chembers was mailed, postage prepaid, to each of the
property owners within the district. (Affidavit of
Mayor Jake Garn, R-37).
18. Thereafter, on April 16, 1974, an informal
public meeting was held, notice of the meeting having
been given and all affected property owners having
been invited to attend. A summary of the proposed
changes were distributed, which summary was patterned
after a "Target Vitality" summary and showed a reduction in cost of $2,764,536.21. All members of the
City Commission attended the meeting, and all persons
desiring to be heard were heard, but no formal action
was taken. (Findings of Fact No. 12, R-44).
19. The adjusted bid of Gibbons and Reed Company as computed by the City was below the engineer's
preliminary estimate of $2,875,189.75, and below a similarly adjusted bid of Schocker Construction Company,
City Engineer Fenton recommended to the Board of
City Commissioners that the contract be awarded to
Gibbons and Reed Company on the basis of the adjusted bid.
9
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20. The "adjusted bid with deletions" of Gibbons
and Reed Company was arrived at in the following
manner:
Base Bid
$4,123,254.15
Less deletions:
Traffic obelisks
$357,200.00
Tree Guards
84,136.00
Thick set pavers at
intersections
389,061.45
7" concrete bed
. 64,700.00
Replacement of suspended system including hatch covers
with grouted paving
system
191,441.24
Storm Sewer
202,534.50
1,289,073.19
Adjusted Bid

2,834,180.96

(Findings of Fact No. 14, R-45).
21. Because of the deletions that would be required in the contract, and the necessity of substitution
of some other work as a result of the deletions, the City
gave consideration to the possibility of rejecting both
of the bids and readvertising the contract. Readvertising for new bids would not have been practicable and
probably would have led to increased costs for the project inasmuch as the bidders would be expected to use
10
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the July costs rather than the February costs, during
a period of rapidly accelerating inflation in the construction industry; the contractors had been given a
sufficient time to determine their costs accurately and
the experience of the City had been that re-bidding of
such a contract, under similar circumstances had never
led a reduction in bid prices. (Findings of Fact No.
15, R-46).
22. The plans and specifications of the contract
required that the pre-cast concrete pavers for the sidewalks to be the product of a manufacturer who was a
licensee of Schokbeton, or comparable thereto. The
only Schokbeton licensee in Utah or Idaho was Otto
Buehner Company of Salt Lake City. Both Schocker
Construction Company and Gibbons and Reed Company had received paver subcontract bids only from
Otto Buehner Company and had based their bid prices
thereon. Otto Buehner Company was the only subcontractor who could practicably supply the concrete
pavers, and its price for such pavers would have been
the same to any prime contractor bidding on the project. (Findings of Fact No. 16, R-46).
23. On or about July 2, 1974, the City issued an
"Order for Extra Work" signed by the City Engineer,
which directed Gibbons and Reed Company to do certain work "pursuant to" section 1 of the contract of
June 12, 1974. The extra work so ordered was as follows :
11
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Description of Work

Value

Shallow drainage system
Roof drain adjustments
Fire alarm pedestals

$14,725.00
$ 2,400.00
$ 1,589.00

TOTAL
(Findings of Fact No. 29, R-50).

$18,714.00

24. I t was important for the City to award the
contract on the basis of the bids previously submitted
because if new bids were sought, the first phase of the
project, between South Temple Street and First South
Street, could not be completed by the scheduled date,
and delayed completion would have a substantial adverse effect upon the businesses of the property owners along that section of Main Street. (Findings of
Fact No. 17,R-46, 47).
25. On June 12, 1974, after advice had been given
by the Salt Lake City Attorney and by the City's
bonding counsel, that a contract could be entered into
without readvertising, a contract was executed between
Salt Lake City and Gibbons and Reed Company at the
agreed price of the adjusted bid as shown in Statement
of Fact No. 20 above. (Findings of Fact No. 18 R-47).
26. The contract, as awarded on June 12, 1974,
deleted in their entirety the traffic obelisks, tree guards,
thickset pavers at the intersections, seven-inch concrete
underlayment (6470 square yards), and the storm sewer
system included in the original plans and specifications.
(Findings of Fact No. 20, R-47).
12
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27. At the time Gibbons and Reed Company and
the City entered into the contract on June 12, 1974, the
folbwing changes with their costs, were contemplated by
the contracting parties:
Grout System
Asphalt Paving at
Intersections
Drainage System

$540,789.02
$ 41,180.00
$ 22,786.00

(Findings of Fact No. 22, R-48).
28. Because of these deletions, completion of the
project required some minor additions to the contract.
Deletion of the storm sewer from the system necessitated
installation of a shallow drainage system; and elimination of the suspended sidewalk system, permitted the
use of non-reinforced sidewalk pavers which were thinner and smaller in dimension. (Findings of Fact No.
21,R-47).
29. Although the "grout system" was not shown
as such in the line items, the contract price included
what was intended to be the cost of the system. (Findings of Fact No. 23, R-48).
30. Replacement of the sidewalk suspension system with a grout system resulted in a net reduction in
cost of $191,441.24, which is the difference between the
line items comprising the suspension system totaling
$731,434.50, as originally bid, and the cost of the side-

13
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walk system as shown in the line items of the adjusted
bid. (Findingsof F a c t N o . 24,R-48).
31. Elimination of the storm sewer system required the addition of a shallow drainage system, and
deletion of the thick set pavers at the intersections required the intersections to be covered with asphalt paving. Neither of these two additions were included in the
total contract price of June 12, 1974, but the contract
did include a unit price for asphalt paving. (Findings
of Fact No. 25,11-48).
32. Under date of September 5, 1974, the City and
Gibbons and Reed Company entered into a Supplemental Agreement to bring the line items into conformance with the plans and specifications. The agreement
provided that line items 205:03 through 205:10 and
205:18 through 205:23 were stricken from the June
12, 1974, contract and line items of the descriptions,
quantities, and prices shown in the September 5, 1974
agreement were substituted therefor. (Findings of
Fact No. 26,R-48).
33. The Supplemental Agreement of September
5, 1974, resulted in a net increase in the contract price
of approximately $784.02. All of the grout necessary
to complete the installation of all pre-cast concrete pavers for the sidewalk system was included in the prices.
(Findings of Fact No. 27, R-49).
34. The pavers included in the substituted line
items as described in the September 5, 1974, agreement
14
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were substantially the same type of pavers as were included in the June 12, 1974, agreement except that
some of the pavers were thinner, nonreinforced, and of
smaller dimensions. Otherwise, the pavers were the
same. They required the same materials and had to be
made by the Schockbeton or a comparable process.
(Findings of Fact No. 28, R-49).
35. The items in the extra work order of July 2,
1974, were not included in the original contract but
were necessaiy in order to complete the project. At
the time of execution of the original contract on June
12, 1974, the need for the shallow drainage system was
known, but the need for roof drain adjustments and
fire alarm pedestals was not. (Findings of Fact No.
30, R-50).
36. Under the plan for the Main Street Improvement Project, the cost of improvements at the intersections is to paid entirely by the City, and the cost of
the asphalt paving in the intersection will not increase
the assessment against the property owners within the
improvement district. (Findings of Fact No. 31, R-50).
37. On or about July 30, 1974, an extra work order
was issued for approximately 3,000 tons of sand, at a
potential cost of $8,250.00. This sand was to be used
in filling abandoned underground vaults through 1974
and 1975, as needed. This item had not been included in
the original contract because of uncertainty as to what
vaults would have to be filled, but the City Commission
had gone on record as saying it would pay the cost of
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sand to be used. Although the estimated cost of the
work order is $8,250.00, Gibbons and Reed Company
committed itself to supply sand at a $2.75 per ton price
for the entire project. This was advantageous to the
City in that it was able to obtain a fixed price, not subject to increase during the 1975 phase of construction.
Only sand actually used need be purchased. (Findings
of Fact No. 32, R-50, 51).
38. The major changes made in the contract prior
to its award to Gibbons and Reed Company consisted
of the entire elimination of some improvements previously contemplated. The remaining changes were not substantial, and were necessitated by the elimination of
other items. (Findings of Fact No. 34, R-52).
39. The changes made by the City after advertising for bids on the project did not substantially change
the character of the project or increase its cost; they
were reasonable, were in fulfillment of the original undertaking, and were necessitated by an emergency situation. (Findings of Fact No. 35, R-52).
40. In making the changes in the contract, the City
and Gibbons and Reed Company acted in good faith
and reasonably under the circumstances. Readvertising
for new bids on the project would have resulted in increased costs for the construction and an unreasonable
delay in completion of phase 1 of the project. If the
readvertising had resulted in costs to the property owners in excess of $505.00 per front foot, additional pro16
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ceedings would have been required under the Municipal
Improvement District Act. (Findings of Fact No. 36,
R-52, 53).
41. The changes made by the City were of the
type contemplated by the original solicitation for bids
and by provisions of 10-16-8, Utah Code Annotated
1953. (Findings of Fact No. 37,R-53).
42. Errors or irregularities in the manner of
awarding the contract, if any, e.g., deletion of some of
the quantities and specified line items, did not go to
the substance of the contract and did not go to the
equity or justice of the proceeding. (Findings of Fact
No. 38,R-53).
43. Approximately one block of the three block
project has been completed and there has been no assessment of tax against the property as of this date. (R-90;
R-580).
44. Gibbons and Reed has had a long history of
contracting work within the State of Utah, and specifically, for Salt Lake City Corporation. They have a
reputation and are known by the City to do high quality
work at reasonable prices. They are a firm of substantial size, capable of handling this large project, with
financial means to handle and expedite this matter. Further, said firm has expertise in the type of project contemplated and has, in the past, been an easy firm with
which the City could deal and correct difficulties as
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contract work progressed. (Affidavit of City Engineer
Joseph Fenton, R-89, 91).
45. The custom and practice of the construction industry for contractors bidding on state and municipal
contracts is to have contract clauses which contain provisions for changes and extra work orders. It is usual
to have changes in specifications and plans after a contract has been let. The custom and practice in the industry on such necessary changes is for the governmental agency and the contractor to agree on a price for the
additional or extra work, or proceed on a "cost plus"
basis. These matters are not let for competitive bidding,
because among other reasons, it would result in confusion, delay and expense by having separate independent contractors on the jobs, not under the supervision of the general contractor.
(Testimony of Noel Gold, R-524-527; R-529-530).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS
A R E P R E S U M E D TO B E V A L I D A N D T H E
PROCEEDINGS CREATING THEM
ARE
P R E S U M E D R E G U L A R ; F U R T H E R , IT IS
PRESUMED THAT MUNICIPAL AUTHORI T I E S COMPLY W I T H T H E L A W AND
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THEY EXERCISE THEIR POWERS IN A
LEGAL AND LAWFUL MANNER. THE
BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE CHALLENGER.
The creation of a special improvement district pursuant to state law is an exercise of legislative power
having its origin in the taxing power. As such, the
court's power to review is limited. This point is clearlymade by our sister state of New Mexico when it stated:
" 'A city council in establishing a sewer district and determining its boundaries, is exercising a legislative power, having its orgin in the
taxing power/ " Feldhake v. City of Sante Fe,
300 P . 2d 934, 939 (New Mexico, 1956), citing
Wolff v. City of Denver, 77 Pac. 364. (Other
citations omitted)
The court further noted from McQuillin:
" 'It has been uniformly held that the action of the municipal legislature, in the pursuance of statutory or charter powers, in establishing a district to be benefited by local public improvements so as to justify a special assessment
against property lying within the district, is a
legislative act which is conclusive in the absence
of any evidence that it mas procured by fraud,
or proof that it is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable, or that the assessment is palpably unjust and apressive. Accordingly, the power of
review of the courts is limited.' " Feldhake v.
City of Sante Fe, id at p. 939, quoting 14 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, S38.47 at p.
157. (Emphasis added)
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This court further correctly noted:
"These propositions of law existing, the
burden of proof as to fraud or arbitrary conduct
equivalent to fraud necessarily rests upon him
who makes an attack upon the action of the city
in determining that a municipal improvement
district shall be established," Feldhake v. City of
Sante Fe, id. at p. 939. (Emphasis added)
Thus, in view of the presumption of validity and
the limited power of review by the court, the district
under attack must be presumed to be valid. The burden
of proof is upon the challengers to establish those elements. See also, City Jacksonville v. Dorwart, 164 N . E .
129 (111. 1928); Wiget v. City of St. Louis, 85 S.W.
2d 1038 (Mo. 1935); Peicke v. Covington, 249 S.W.
1008 (Ky. 1923) ; 63 CJS Mun. Corp. §1137.
In Point I of the plaintiff-appellant's brief, they
attempt to give this court the impression that the City
had a binding pohcy of the City Commission not to
approve a special improvement district, if there were
more than 50% opposed to it. The record contradicts
that implication. Regarding this subject, the testimony
of Mayor Garn in his deposition is as follows:
"Q. So this is just a touchstone, if I may
use that phraseology, in determining whether
you would or would not approve, but not necessarily binding on yourself or any other commissioner, is that correct?
A. No. It's absolutely not binding. It's a
20
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feeling we have and we follow. But as to Mr.
Roe's question, it is not an ordinance and certainly not binding on us collectively or/individually.
Q. Well, I'm just saying would three votes
have made any difference even though you're
talking about 49 percent or 51 percent opposed?
A. If the final tabulation, as far as I am personally concerned, would have ended up with the
majority protesting, my personal vote would
have been against the project.
Q. But that wouldn't have been binding on the
other commissioners.
A. No, absolutely not, any more than any
other issue that comes up. I think it is important
Roger, if you just permit me for a minute on that
meeting on January the 25th. Even though I
personally, and again my own personal opinion,
had made a public statement that I would vote
with the majority, and I still stand by that and
that is my personal policy, when the vote was so
close against indicating 50.85 percent in favor.
And I said to the commission, I said, even though
I have made a commitment, I will not vote to
approve that project with such a slim margin
until we've had an opportunity to go through
with the hearing that I had promised the property owners. So let's take it under advisement."
(Deposition of Mayor Jake Garn, at p. 48-49.)
Further, the statement of plaintiff-appellants that
they have in some manner been prejudiced by detrimental reliance is entirely unsupported by the evidence.
21
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The undisputed facts show that each of the property
owners received actual notice of the meetings and had
the opportunity to present protests. The plaintiff-appellants have admitted that they individually received
acual notice of every meeting held and have admitted
they were either personally present at the meetings or
were represented.
At no time has any evidence been presented that
any property owner entitled to file a protest did not file
if he desired, or was diimaded from filing because of
the alleged City 50% protest policy. In fact, over the
entire length of these proceedings, no one has even suggested the name of any property owner entitled to file
a dissent was dis^iaded from doing so. Rather, plaintiffappellants make the naked assertion that somehow they
detrimentally relied on statements of the Commmissioners without one scintilla of evidence to meet their burden
of proof on this issue.
Utah law regarding the filing of a dissent as applicable to this special improvement district is clear and
unequivocal. I t states:
"For purposes of this section, the necessary
number of protests shall mean the aggregate of
the following:
(a) Protests representing two-thirds of the
property to be assessed in cases where an assessment is proposed to be made according to frontage, or
22
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(b)...
(c) . . .
If less than the necessary number of protests
are filed by the owners of the property to be assessed, the governing body shall have jurisdiction
to create the special improvement district and
proceed with the making of the improvements"
10-16-7(3). Utah Code Ann. 1953 (Replacement Volume 2A). (Emphasis added)
Thus, not only has the plaintiff-appelbnt failed to meet
his burden of proof, but the statute clearly precludes
their assertion.
However, even accepting arguendo that the City is
somehow bound, contrary to the provisions of Utah law
to a 50 percent test, the facts clearly show that this test
has been met. The law specifically permits the withdrawal of protests during this hearing and evaluation
period. I t states that in computing the percentage of
protesters, the municipality shall not count:
". . . (i) Protests relating to property or relating to a type of improvement which has been
deleted from the district, and (ii) Protests which
have been withdrawn in writing prior to the conclusion of the hearing." 10-16-7(3), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, (Replacement Vol. 2A). Emphasis added.
The facts are undisputed that the meeting scheduled
in the notice of protest was duly held January 17, 1974.
This meeting was continued until January 25, 1974,
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pursuant to written notice of all of the property owners
concerned with this district. Thus, contrary to the assertion of the plaintiff-appellants in their brief the law
specifically permits the withdrawing of protests and
appellants citation of 1895 and 1929 cases can hardly
amend language of a 1969 statute.
Further, in view of the clear statutory provision
fixing the protesters at two-thirds, the City commission
cannot be barred from considering the withdrawal of
two protests and thus, reducing those protesting or
opposed to the district to 44.4%, regardless of the time
when withdrawn. The rule of thumb of some commissioners that they would personally not vote for a district, if more than fifty percent opposed it, as a legislative policy question, should not be codified into law by
judicial fiat, as requested by appellants. Rather, these
are political decisions for which the commissioners were
elected to make and for which they are responsible to
the electorate. If they choose in that political decision
making process not to consider protests which have been
withdrawn they are well within their statutory power
and may approve or disapprove the project. That is
exclusively a political and not a judicial decision.
Thus, under any count of the protesters, the board
acted entirely within the scope of its statutory authority
and exercised its political discretionary powers vested
by state statute in approving the special improvement
district. The decision of Judge Croft affirming their
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right under the law to make decision should not be disturbed by this court.

POINT II
T H E C R E A T I O N O F A S P E C I A L IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT BY A U T A H CITY
IS A U T H O R I Z E D BY STATE LAW. COMPLIANCE W I T H T H E PROVISIONS OF STATE
L A W I S TO B E J U D G E D B Y A S T A N D A R D
OF "SUBSTANTIAL" COMPLIANCE AND
M E R E I R R E G U L A R I T I E S W I L L NOT VOID
T H E DISTRICT.
A. Substantial Compliance.
This court has stated what standards are to be applied in determining the compliance with statutory requirements for creation of a special improvement district. I t has said:
". . . (T)he courts generally hold that the
giving of such notice (Notice of Intention to
create a district) is jurisdictional, and must be
substantially complied^ml/n order to authorize a
levy of an assessment. 4 McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, §1849-1852 . . . (Other citations
omitted) The diversity among the decisions is
not with respect to giving notice, but there is
a marked difference among th c m with respect to
the sufficiency of the notice where notice is
given." Jones v. Foulger, 46 U. 419, 150 P . 933
(1915). (Emphasis added).
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This observation was cited with approval in a 1974
decision of this court. In voiding a district for the total
failure of Kanab City to provide for a Board of Equalization and Review, the court stated:
" . . . Failure of the City to substantially comply
with the statutes pertaining to the giving of notice
are jurisdictional." Lewis v. Kanab City, -U.2d-,
523*P.2d417, 418 (1974).
Thus, the City need not "strictly" meet all statutory requirements of the creation of an improvement
district on pain of running the gauntlet of a jurisdiction
defect and dismissal. Rather, a special improvement is
valid if it "substantially" complies with the enabling
legislation and a technical defect will not be grounds
for judicially declaring it void.
B. The Notice of Intention
provement District.

of this Special

Im-

The Notice of Intention of this special improvement district complies with state law by generally describing the improvements to be made and stating the
purpose for its creation. *
In the case before the bar, there is no question that
the Notice was given or that it was published as required by law; rather, the plaintiff-appellants have
challenged only the sufficiency of the Notice of Intention. In this challenge they state that the published
notice did not:
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1. State the "purpose' 1 for which the assessments were made;
2. Describe the improvements to be made;
3. Advise abutting property owners and the
citizens of Salt Lake in general, that streets
would be narrowed and the grade changed; and
4.Give notice that traffic pattern on Main
Street would be changed. (Point I I of plaintiffappellants Brief).
A reading of the Notice and applicable Utah statutes
answers these challenges clearly.
Section 10-16-4 of the Utah Code states that special
improvement districts may be created, among other
things therein listed, to: (1) Establish, open, extend
and widen any street or sidewalk; (2) Install sewers,
drains or parks; (3) Construct bridges or street lighting; (4) Cover or fence reservoirs, canals, ditches or
other water facilities; (5) Acquire and maintain parking lots; and (6) Construct recreational facilities and
parks. See, 10-16-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended in 1969. This section also specifically provides that special improvement districts and tax assessments may be levied to pay for any such improvement;
it states:
"For the purpose of making or paying for all
or a part of the cost of any such improvements
. . ., the governing body of a municipality may
. . . levy assessments on the property within such
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a district. . . . "10-16-4(2),- Utah Code
1953.

Ann.

The statute regarding Notice of Intention only requires
that the municipality state what improvements are to be
made in a "general way." It provides that the notice:
"In a general way, describe the improvements
proposed to be made showing the places the improvements are proposed to be made and the
general nature of the improvements." 10-16-5 (1)
(d), Utah Code Ann, 1953; cf. 10-16-5 (a),
which says they will also state the "purpose" for
tax assessments. (Emphasis added).
It is submitted that these three sections must be
read together. Certainly the legislative merely intended
that the property owners be apprised in a "general way"
of the improvements proposed and be advised of the
"purpose" for the assessment; that is, that the assessment is to do curb and gutter type of work and not to
purchase land for a park, building a water reservoir or
some other authorized project. This statutory construction seems certain since the legislature did not require
a statement of "purposes." Obviously, there are many
collateral and subjective types of purposes in any construction projects and not all of these need be published
under law. Further, the legislature seems to have gone
out of its way to make it abundantly clear, by stating
the improvements need only be described in a "general
way," that specifics need not be made a part of the
notice. Certainly plaintiff-appellants citing of cases
dating 50 years before this law was passed have no
28
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precedent value on that issue.
Rather, Utah case decisions rendered after the
Municipal Improvement District Act of 1969 was
passed have sustained this interpretation of a general
type notice. The most recent decision is the 1971 case
of Dawson v. Swapp, 26 Ut.2d 250, 487 P.2d 1288
(1971). Like the case before the bar, the plaintiff there
attempted to challenge the sufficiency of the Notice of
Intention; he charged that it failed to state:
a. All of the purposes of the project in the
Notice of Intent, i.e., the purchase of land; and
b. A general description of the work to be
done.
In this Swapp case, the notice described the improvements as consisting:
" . . . of the necessary grading and construction
or reconstruction of the curbs, gutters, driveways, sidewalks and other appurtenant facilities
and works." Dawson v. Swapp, id. at p. 1289.
This court observed that the lower court judge:
" . . . found that the notice of intention and its
publication fully complied with the statutory requirements and that sufficient notice was furnished to all interested persons of the intention to
create the district and the improvements intended
to be made." Dawson v. Swapp, id. at p. 1289.
That lower court holding was not disturbed by the court
and it affirmed the dismissal by Judge Gould of the
challengers action.
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In the case before the Bar, Salt Lake City, Notice
of Intention is virtually identical to the Swapp case.
I t described the purpose and the improvements to be
made in a general way by stating that the proposed
improvement district was :
"To remove all existing curbs, gutters, sidewalks and street paving and construct new street
paving, pedestrian paving, landscape structure,
planters and planting, curb and gutters, together
with new street lighting and drainage structures,
and do all the work necessary to complete the
project in accordance with Salt Lake City standards."

"All other necessary things shall be done to
complete the whole project in a proper and
workmanlike manner according to the plans,
profiles and specifications on file with the Salt
Lake City Engineer . . ." Statement of Fact No.
3 and Appendix 1.
Further on file with the City Engineer were the
plans and profiles and specifications which showed
the details of the project in the notice. I t showed the
grade changes, the change in vehicular and pedestrian
traffic patterns and the change in space allocations for
pedestrian and vehicular traffic. (Affidavit of City
Engineer Joseph Fenton, R-84). Our sister state Idaho
specifically approved this incorporation by reference to
augment a notice of intention to create a special im-
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provement district. In the case of Dement v. City of
Caldwell, the Idaho court upheld plans incorporated by
reference and held:
" . . . the reference to the plans and specifications is sufficient to give notice to all parties
interested in the general character of the proposed works." Dement v. City of Caldwell, 125
P . 200, 202 (Ida. 1912) ; see also 13 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporation, §37.85 and
therein
cited.
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that even if one
accepts arguendo, plaintiff-appellants position that the
Notice should have been more specific, the incorporation
by reference of the detailed plans gave all notice of the
details of this proposed improvement district. The
statute regarding notice has been more than "substantially" complied with by the City and the district is
valid.
The only known case to the writer which has language which could possibly be construed to support the
appellants position that the Notice of Intention of Salt
Lake City was not sufficient, is a 1917 case of Gwilliam
v. Ogden City, 49 Ut. 555, 164 P . 1022 (1917). However that case is distinguishable because the plans were
not incorporated by reference. Further, with regard
to the notice requirement, that case was based on Section 273 of the Laws in force in 1917; and that section
of Utah law has long ago been repealed. In fact, the
1969 State Legislature passed a Comprehensive Municipal Improvement District Act, which Act as a whole,
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shows that the publications are for the purpose of giving property owners notice of the project, not in specifics, but in a "general" way. The change in the language specifically by inserting "general way" make£
the Gwilliam holding on this point of no precedent value.
Obviously, under the present law, the notices of intention are not intended to be published in book form.
The Notice of Intention in the case before the bar
certainly meets this legislative intent and "substantially"
complies with state law. Further, the challengers have
not shown any prejudice and have not even alleged
that anyone in the district was, in fact, unaware of:
(a) The grade change of less than one foot; (b) The
elimination of one traffic lane to make Main Street
have two vehicle traffic lanes in each direction, instead
of two in one and three in another; and (c) The alteration of some vehicular traffic patterns by preventing
Main Street from being a thoroughfare to Davis County
over Victory Road.
I t is respectfully submitted that the Notice is valid
within the meaning of the 1969 Municipal District Act
and this court should so find.

POINT III
A S T R E E T IS T H A T A R E A B E T W E E N
P R O P E R T Y LINES AND INCLUDES SIDEWALKS AND SPACE FOR VEHICULAR
T R A F F I C . A S S U C H , T H E R E I S NO N E E D TO
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PASS AN ORDINANCE W H E N THE CITY
CHOOSES TO CHANGE THE ALLOCATION
OF SPACE BETWEEN VEHICULAR AND
PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC ON SALT LAKE
CITY STREETS.
Plaintiff-appellants have assigned as error the alleged failure of the City to pass an ordinance narrowing a street as required by Section 10-8-8.2, Utah Code
Ann. 1953, as amended. This statute provides as follows :
"When in the opinion of the governing body
of the city there is good cause for vacating, or
narrowing a street or alley, or any part thereof,
and that such vacation or narrowing will not be
detrimental to the general interest, it may, by
ordinance, and without petition therefor, vacate
or narrow such street or alley or any part thereof."
Significantly, Section 10-8-8.5, Utah Code Ann. 1953,
provides that when the street has been narrowed by ordinance, that action shall constitute a relinquishment
of the City's ownership therein. The statute provides:
"The action of the governing body vacating or
narrowing a street . . . which has been dedicated
to public use by a proprietor, shall operate to the
extent to which it is vacated or narrowed, . . .
as a revocation of the acceptance thereof and the
city's relinquishment of the city's fee therein by
the governing body. . . ." (Emphasis added).
Thus, the statutes are clear if a street is narrowed
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or vacated by ordinance as permitted by Utah statutes,
to the degree that the street is narrowed or vacated, the
ownership and rights of the City to that property is
abandoned and vacated. Obviously, the intent of the
legislature was not to require that whenever a municipality chose to allocate portions of this right-of-way
to vehicular or pedestrian traffic, that it must pass an
ordinance and thereby lose ownership thereof. This is
the result that would accompany the logic propounded
by the plaintiff-appellants in their brief.
Rather, Utah law is clear that the word "street"
contemplates the full area between abutting property
lines. This point was made clear early by the Utah
Court in the case of Davidson v. Utah Independent
Telephone Co., 34 U. 249, 197 P . 124, 125 (1908).
Here, in rejecting the claim that the word "street"
meant only area used for vehicular traffic, the court
stated:
"The word 'street', 'as commonly used and understood' means a highway in a town or city
used for the public for travel either by means of
vehicles or on foot, and embraces all of the areas
between the lots on either side." (Emphasis added) (Citations omitted) See also, Salt Lake City
V. Schubach, 108 U. 266, 159 P. 2d 149 (1945)';
Stringham v. Salt Lake City, 114 U. 517 201 P.
2d 758 (1949) ; Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 U.
2d 27, 492 P . 2d 1335 (1972), City of Holdenvtfle v. Talley, 240 P . 2d 761 (Okl. 1952), cited
with approval in Gallegos v. Midvale City.
Thus, it is clear and obvious that City has not nar-
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rowed the "street"; rather, it has merely changed the
space allocations for vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
It has not narrowed the street within the meaning of
10-8-8.2. Therefore, no passage of an ordinance is required.
Further, contrary to the assertion of the plaintiffappellants, the lower court did not find the "street"
narrowed. The memorandum decision of Judge Croft,
referred to by the plaintiff-appellants in Point I I of
their brief, constituted a partial granting of defendantrespondents motion for a summary judgment. His
statement in that decision referring to undisputed facts
that one lane of the then five lane Main Street was eliminated and that space allocated to sidewalk area; two
lanes of vehicular traffic in both dired^f^were and are
to remain. To suggest that the lower court made a finding of fact on conflicting evidence in that summary
judgment proceeding is ludicrous. (See, the Plans entered as Exhibits T3-D and T4-D and the testimony of
Mayor Jake Garn at Deposition p. 28; cf. Memorandum Decision of Judge Croft in which he specifically
held that Section 10-8-8.2 could not create a jurisdictional defect in the Municipal Improvement District
Act, R-285; cf. R-290).
However, even accepting arguendo, the position
of the plaintiff-appellants that a City ordinance should
have been passed, it does not follow, as was specifically
held by Judge Croft, that the provisions of Section 108-8.2, Utah Code Ann. is a jurisdictional element for
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creation of a special improvement district. It will be
noted that the aforesaid section of the Utah Code is not
within the Municipal Improvement District Act and
cannot possibly be construed to be a jurisdiction requirement thereof. In fact, the said Municipal Improvement District Act specifically provides that it:
". . . shall constitute full authority for the
making of improvements, creations of special
improvement district, levying of assessments,
and the issuance of special improvement bonds
by municipalities." 10-16-38, Utah Code Ann.
1953, as amended.
The failure to pass such an ordinance provided in
Chapter 8 could not be considered jurisdictional to void
the improvement district created under the provisions
of Chapter 16, when it is expressly stated to be self executing.
In addition, it is important to note that Utah law
grants to the cities the unbridled power and discretion
to lay out, establish, alter, widen or narrow streets and
sidewalks. The statute provides as follows:
"They may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave . . . streets . . .
sidewalks . . ." 10-8-8, Utah Code Ann. 1953,
as amended. (Emphasis added)
Thus, the City has broad power and right to allocate
right-of-way areas between vehicular and pedestrian
traffic. There is no requirement that there be any
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notice whatsoever given for this exercise of city prerogatives in managing the streets.
Further, Utah law is clear that property owners
have no vested right in traffic flow. The cases are consistent and uniform in their holding; a representative
case states as follows:
"It is settled in this jurisdiction that the land
owner has no property right in the flow of traffic on a public highway." Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 304, 393 P . 2d 917
(1963) and cases therein cited; see also, Town
or State v. Roselli, 101 U. 464, 120 P . 2d 276;
Springville Banking Co. v. Barton, 10 U. 2d 349
P. 2d 157; Robinette v. Price, 74 U. 512, 280 P .
2d 736.
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that this court
should affirm the lower court's ruling that the special
improvement district is not void or defective because it
altered space allocations between vehicular and pedestrian traffic on Main Street. The abutting property
owners have no vested right to traffic patterns of a
street. The street has not been narrowed; rather,
space allocations between vehicular and pedestrian traffic have merely been altered as permitted by law. Further, the passage or failure to pass a city ordinance relating to an alleged street narrowing is not a jurisdictional element for the creation of a special improvement
district.
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P O I N T IV
EVEN ACCEPTING ARGUENDO THAT
T H E N O T I C E O F I N T E N T I O N TO C R E A T E
A D I S T R I C T W A S D E F E C T I V E I N SOME
JURISDICTIONAL ASPECT, THAT DEFECT
DOES N O T V O I D T H E D I S T R I C T ; R A T H E R ,
EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE DISTRICT
A N D T H E T A X B E H E L D V A L I D SO F A R AS
T H E CHALLENGERS HAVE BEEN BENEF I X E D A N D TO T H E E X T E N T T H E C I T Y
HAS NOT E X C E E D E D ITS AUTHORITY.
It is well settled law in the State of Utah that even
an improvement district has been created with jurisdiction*^defects, the entire district is not voided. Rather,
only those portions which exceed the City authority are
invalidated.
The principle case concerning this subject, concerned the creation of a curb and gutter district which
plaintiff-appellants challenged on the ground that the
Notice of Intention failed to:
a. State the purpose for which the taxes would
be levied; and
b. Describe the proposed improvements which
were contemplated.
This court observed:
"The law is well settled that, if what the city
does merely amounts to an irregularity, either in
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publishing notice or in letting contracts, or in
their execution, etc., the assessment of tax imposed to defray the cost of the improvement cannot be collaterally assailed in equity or otherwise.
If, however, what the city does or omits to do
affects its power or jurisdiction to make the proposed improvement, that is, if the publication of
the notice is jurisdictional, and the city in publishing said notice does not comply with the requirements of the law, and, for that reason, does
not acquire jurisdiction to order or to make the
proposed improvement and to levy the special
tax to defray the cost thereof upon the abutting
property, the the tax may be collaterally assailed
at any time." GwilHam v. Ogden City, 49 U.
555, 164 P. 1022, 1024 (1917).
Thereafter the court reasoned that the Notice of Intention of Ogden City failed to meet the requirements imposed by Section 273 of the Law of Utah 1917 and
stated:
"In all the foregoing cases this court held that
the things required of the city by Sec. 273 (notice of intention) are jurisdictional, and unless
they are complied with with reasonable strictness the city authorities are without power or jurisdiction to impose a special assessment or tax to
defray the cost of the proposed improvement."
Gwilliam v. Ogden City, id. at p. 1024.
However, after so holding that the notice was jurisdictional and was defective, the court refused to void the
entire district. Rather, it deleted from the tax assessment only that portion concerning street grading, which
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was not properly made subject of the Notice of Intention under then existing law. The court specifically
held:
"To the extent that the tax is valid and as far
as it benefited plaintiffs' property equity requires that their property be held to pay the
same. To the extent that the city has exceeded
its authority and hence seeks to impose an invalid
assessment and tax upon plaintiffs' property,
they should be given relief." Gmlliam v. Ogden
City, id. at p. 1025.
Therefore, the court specifically refused to enjoin
collection of the improvement assessment and held that
the court in equity would restrain the city only from enforcing the invalid portion of the tax; that is, that portion which was not properly made a part of the Notice
as required by law.
Another case closely in point is Branting v. Salt
Lake City, 153 P . 995 (1915). In this case, the Utah
Supreme Court was asked to rule on an objection to a
special improvement district which attempted to levy
an assessment in excess of the Engineer's estimated
costs published in the Notice of Intention. The complainants argued that had all the property owners been
aware of the cost, they may have been unwilling to approve the district and filed timely protests. The court
acknowledged the possibility but rejected the argument,
stating that a taxpayer had a duty to file timely protests. When they did not file protests, they waived their
40

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rights to oppose the district; that is, the court apparently rejected the argument that the entire district must
be voided for an alleged jurisdictional defect in the
Notice of Intent. The court stated specifically:
"Now, they (plaintiffs) say, the taxpayers
may have been willing to pay the cost of the improvement according to the estimate, while they
may not have been willing to pay for one which
exceeded the estimated cost. That may be so,
but that is not the controlling question here. Taxpayers like all other persons, must take notice of
and abide by the law. Branting v. Salt Lake
City, id. at p. 999. (Emphasis added)
The Municipal Improvement Act of 1969 also contemplates this result by limiting judicial review. That
law provides:
"No assessment or proceeding in a special improvement district shall be declared void or set
aside in whole or in part in consequence of any
error or irregularity which does not go to the
equity or justice of the assessment or proceeding. However, any party . . . who has not
waived his objections thereto (by failure to file
protest or object) . . . shall have the right to
commence a civil action against the municipality
to enjoin the levy or collection of the assessment
or to set aside and declare unlawful the proceedings."
"(2) . . . Such action shall be the exclusive
remedy of any aggrieved, party. No court shall
entertain any complaint which the party was
authorized to make, but did not make in a pro41
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test filed pursuant to Section 10-16-7 or at hearings held pursuant to Section 10-16-17, or any
complaint that does not go to the equity or justice
of the assessment or proceeding " 10-16-28 (1)
(2), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. (Emphasis added)
It is respectfully submitted that this observation
is the reason why this Court in 1971 ruled that it was
premature to commence an action prior to the time that
an actual tax assessment had been made. Only that
portion of the tax illegally assessed may be challenged
and only those persons who properly filed protests or
objections may so object. See, Dawson v. Swapp, supra. Thus, the law in Utah is clear that j urisdictional defects may only be asserted by those who have properly
filed protests. Further, only those particular defects
must be deleted from the project's tax assessment.
In the case before the Bar, even if one accepts the
entire position of plaintiff-appellants that the Notice of
Intention was defective for failure to notify the landowners of the grade change and the others mentioned,
the only remedy would be to delete the proportionate
cost thereof from the protestor's tax assessments. Those
sums deleted would be paid by the City. On this point,
the Municipal Improvement District Act states:
"If any property shall be illegally assessed
. . . the municipality so assessing such property
shall be liable to the holder of the special improvement bond issuing against the funds created by such assessments, which amount shall be
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paid from the general fund of the municipality."
10-16-29 (2), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
This statutory provision follows former case law
statements. In Ryberg v. Lundstrom, 70 U. 517, 261
P . 453 (1927), the court refused to grant a writ of mandamus to compel the city to levy an assessment after a
special improvement district was held void for failure
to establish a Board of Equalization. The court held
that extraordinary relief was not available because the
City was required to pay the contractor from the general fund and that it was legal for the city to make an
additional assessment in substitute for the illegal one.
Virtually identical to that result was the case of Booth
v. Midvale City, 184 P. 799 (1919) In this case, the
court refused to grant a writ of prohibition to restrain
the city from paying the cost of repaving a road. In
that case, the complainant urged that the city lacked
power to improve a road without establishing a special
improvement district to assess the cost to abutting landowners. The court rejected this argument and held
that the city had authority to contract the work under
other powers and it was, therefore, authorized to pay for
the roadway improvements from the general fund for
the work performed.
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the law in
Utah is clear in that only those portions of an improvement district which are not properly part of the district
are exempt from a tax levy under that district. Further,
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only those persons filing proper protest may object to
assessments levied against their property. Those improvements which are held not to be properly part of the
district will be paid for by the city from its general
fund. Further, even if the plaintiff-appellants position
were accepted, the court is not in a position to make a
determination of what portions of the project shall be
assumed by the city, until after a tax levy and assessment has been made. Therefore, the Improvement District should be upheld.

POINT V
THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS
ORD E R TO S H O W C A U S E C A L L E D A N "ALTERNATIVE W R I T OF PROHIBITION" IN
CASE NO. 221266, F A I L E D TO C O M P L Y
W I T H T H E P R O V I S I O N S O F R U L E 65 O F
T H E U T A H RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND WAS PROPERLY SET ASIDE AND
D E N I E D B Y T H E L O W E R COURT.
Point I V of plaintiff-appellants brief is essentially a red herring; however, a short response will
be made to avoid confusion of the jfcrmam issues of this
case.
The facts that show that the plaintiff-appellants
filed an action under Third District Court Case No.
220475, on or about June 20, 1974. Thereafter, on July
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31, 1974 the plaintiff-appellants filed a pleading under
case number 221266, alleging virtually identical facts.
In the latter action, they prayed for a temporary restraining order which they called an "Alternate Writ of
Prohibition" and had the same executed ex parte by
Judge Marcellus f. Snow on July 31, 1974. Said order,
issued without prior notice to the City, enjoined the
City from further work on the Main Street project and
set-up a hearing date when said order would become
final. It specifically stated:
"You are further commanded to show cause
before this court at 2:00 p.m. on the 15th day of
August, 1974, or as soon thereafter as counsel
may be heard, in the courtroom of the Honorable
Gordon R. Hall, one of the judges of the above
entitled court at the Courts Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah, why you should not permanently
and absolutely be restrained and prohibited from
proceeding in the respects and particulars above
stated and more particularly complained of in
the verified petition on file herein and why petitioner should not have such other and further relief as may be appropriate in the premises."
(Temporary Restraining Order called "Alternative Writ of Prohibition, R-14-15; Court Minute Entry, R-24).
There was no attempt by the plaintiff-appellant to
comply in any regard with the provisions of Rule 65 of
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in obtaining said temporary order. They failed to even allege, let alone state
facts sufficient to show how they would be irreparably
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harmed or damaged. The judge failed to note thereon
the date and time when issued and failed to state that
the order would expire within ten days, unless the order
was reissued. Further, and most importantly, the plaintiff-appellants failed to post any security to indemnify
the City or Gibbons and Reed from any of the damages
and losses which would inherently flow from halting this
construction project in midstream.
Therefore, the City Attorney attempted to contact
Judge Snow concerning the order; however, he was on
vacation. The law anil motion judge set the matter
aside ex parte pursuant to the provisions of Rule 65,
which provides that the court can set aside an ex parte
temporary restraining order on ".'. . such notice as the
court may prescribe." Because of its inherent defects,
no notice was deemed necessary to vacate the temporary restraining order by the court; but the hearing date
on the order to show cause why such a restraining order
should not be issued was still in effect. Subsequent
cross motions for summary judgment were filed. All
matters were set for hearing on the order to show cause
date of August 15, 1974 at 2:00 p.m. (R-28-31).
These matters were transferred from Judge Hall
to Judge Croft of the Third District Court. Judge
Croft indicated that he did not have sufficient time to
prepare for the matter August 15 and, pursuant to an
agreement between all counsel, the matter was continued for hearing August 19, 1974. On August 19, 1974,
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the court considered the memorandums, affidavits and
matters of record before the court. Third District Court
Case No. 220475 and Case No. 221266 were consolidated for hearing and the court heard oral arguments by
all counsel.
At the hearing the court also noted that the Alternate Writ of Prohibition was a temporary restraining order and that the plaintiff-appellants had failed
to comply with the provisions of Rule 65 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court stated:
( T H E C O U R T ) : "My point is simply this.
Before we leave it, I want to make it clear what
I think on this matter and, that is, you filed a
petition for a writ of prohibition. In connection
with that you asked for a temporary restraining
order."
(MR. G U S T I N ) : "No, we did not, your
honor."
( T H E C O U R T ) : "Yes, you do. That's
what he does. H e temporarily restrains and orders the defendants to appear and show cause
why the writ shouldn't be made permanent, you
see. What you are doing is, you file a petition
and you want to restrain the defendants from
doing something and what you are arguing, is,
even though you are asking for a temporary restraining order, the rule with respect to temporary restraining orders doesn't apply and I don't
agree with you." (Argument Transcript, R.
382)
Subsequently, after more discussion on the point,
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Judge Croft stated that he could rule on Mr. Gustin's
motion for summary judgment and resolve the question
of whether a Writ of Prohibition should issue after the
hearing. Mr. Gustin agreed; the record states as follows:
( T H E C O U R T ) : "If I grant your motion
for summary judgment today, I can probably
rule on the question of jurisdiction in any event.
(MR. G U S T I N ) : "Right, so we will pass the
matter and go to the motion for summary judgment with reference to the injunction suit, civil
no. 220475." (Argument Transcript, 383)
Subsequently, the court after fully reviewing the record
and hearing argument, denied the plaintiff-appellants
motion for summary judgment and granted the City
a partial summary judgment, reserving for trial only
the issue of the contract validity. (Memorandum Decision of Judge Croft, R-41-53)
I t is submitted that plaintiff-appellants have cited
no case to justify their disregard for the provisions of
Rule 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They
voluntarily submitted the matter for hearing and the
lower court ruled as a matter of law that the improvement district was valid. To now pose a procedural issue
regarding the vacation of a temporaiy restraining order
and the refusal of the lower court, after a full hearing, to
reissue it, does not serve to illuminate this court on any
germane issue.
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POINT VI
T H E STATE MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT ACT SPECIFICALLY
AUTHORIZES DELETIONS TO BE MADE
FROM PROJECTS, A F T E R BIDDING HAS
BEEN COMPLETED; F U R T H E R , T H E CONTRACT TERMS OUTLINING T H E TERMS
OF BIDDING AUTHORIZES SUCH D E L E TIONS TO BE MADE BY T H E CITY.
The City adopts the brief of Co-Defendant-Respondent Gibbons and Reed on this point.

POINT VII
T H E CONTRACT SUBJECT OF T H E
W I T H I N LITIGATION WAS L E T TO T H E
LOWEST RESPONSIBLE BIDDER. E X T R A
WORK ORDERS AND COSTS INCURRED
DUE TO T H E CHANGES IN PLANS AND
SPECIFICATIONS, W H I C H W E R E MADE
IN GOOD F A I T H AND W I T H O U T COLLUSION OR FRAUD AND NOT MOTIVATED OR
I N F L U E N C E D BY PERSONAL FAVORITISM OR I L L W I L L , ARE INCLUDED W I T H IN T H E ORIGINAL CONTRACT BID AND
N E E D NOT BE SUBMITTED FOR ADDITIONAL AND SEPARATE BIDDING PROCEDURES.
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The City adopts the brief of Co-Defendant-Respondent Gibbons and Reed on this point.

SUMMARY
The creation of a special improvement district is
a legislative function of Salt Lake City Corporation
and, as such, the acts of the legislature are presumed
to be valid, lawful and within the scope of legislative
authority. Further, judicial review of those legislative
actions in creating a special improvement district is
limited to those areas charging that acts of the City
were arbitrary, capricious, grossly unjust or inequitable, or that the City lacked lawful authority or jurisdiction to proceed. The party attacking the District has
the burden of proof concerning these elements. In addition, in evaluating the conduct of the city legislative
body against applicable state law, the City must only
be in "substantial" compliance to those statutory requirements. Plaintiff-appellants have wholly failed to
meet that burden in this challenge to the Improvement

District.
A review of the facts in this case clearly demonstrates that all of the conditions and requirements for
establishing a special improvement district were "substantially" complied with. The Notice of Intent stated
the "purpose" of the District and stated in a "general
way" the improvements to be made. The challengers
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assertion that detailed and specific notices as required
under a repealed law in effect in 1917 is not well taken.
However, even if the court were of the persuasion
that a detailed and specific Notice of Intention should
be published, the City has complied. In the Notice of
Intention, the City incorporated by reference the detailed plans and specifications of this project which
were filed with the City Engineer. These plans gave
all persons concerned constructive notice of the minute
details of grade changes, alterations of traffic flow patterns and changes in space allocations for pedestrian
and vehicular traffic.
Further, the street right-of-way was not narrowed
as charged; rather, the City exercised its statutory powers to decide how much of it should be used for vehicular
and pedestrian traffic. Again, even accepting arguendo,
the challengers position that failure to pass an ordinance
concerning an alleged narrowing of the street is not a
matter which goes to justice, equity or jurisdiction as
to void this improvement district.
In addition, even accepting arguendo the position
of plaintiff that the district was created with defects in
the Notice of Intent, those defects do not rise to the level
to require this court to enjoin or halt construction.
Rather, only those specific items which are subject to
improper notice may be subject to attack, after the tax
assessment has been levied by the city. The city can
pay those items which may have not been properly sub51
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ject to assessment in the district. In this case, the property owners total construction cost is $505 per front
foot; the balance of the costs will be paid from city
capital improvements budget. Even if the court finds
some defects, it is premature to object to the district
on those items until there has been an attempt to levy
a tax for them.
This Main Street Improvement Project is approximately one-third completed. The work, planning and
expense which has been undertaken since 1963 should
not, at this point in time, be destroyed. The Main Street
Improvement District should be upheld and allowed
to proceed to culminate, by completion of the final
two blocks.

Respectfully submitted,
ROGER F. CUTLER
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Salt Lake City Corporation
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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NOTICE
N O T I C E IS H E R E B Y G I V E N by the Board of Commissioners of
Salt L a k e City, Utah, of the intention of such Board of Commissioners
to make the following described improvements:
To remove all existing curbs, gutters, sidewalks and street paving
and construct new street paving, pedestrian paving, landscape structures, planters and planting, curbs and gutters, together with new
street lighting and drainage structures, and to do all other work necessary to complete the project in accordance with Salt L a k e City Standards.
All the street frontage in this extension, upon which improvements
are to be made, will be assessed up to an amount not to exceed.
$505.00 per front foot, with the City to absorb all additional amounts as
determined from the Urban Designer's estimates.
This extension will be constructed within the following described
area and boundaries and upon the following named street:
A R E A : Blocks 57, 58, 69, 70, 75 and 76 of Plat " A " , Salt L a k e City
Survey.
BOUNDARIES:
North — South Temple Street
South — 3rd South Street
East - State Street
West - West Temple Street
•STREET:
Main Street — South Temple Street to 3rd South Street
I M P R O V E M E N T S A N D E S T I M A T E D COSTS
PROPOSED
IMPROVEMENTS

Est. Cost Per
Front Foot

Removals
Roadway and Underground
Underlavmentfor
Pedestrian Paving
Pedestrian Paving
Lighting/Electrical
Landscape Structures
Architectural Features
Planting

Front Feet of
Total
Abutting Property Estimated Cost

$31.864392
60.085032

3,965.91
3,965.91

T26,371.31
238,291.83

26.981999
166.123258
39.078391
81.294815
41.617684
57.954429

3,965.91
3,965.91
3,965.91
3,965.91
3,965.91
3,965.91

107,008.18
658,829.89
154,981.38
322,407.92
165,051.99

Total Estimated Abutter's Cost Exclusive of
Extra Costs for Structural Slabs
Abutter's Total Rate $505.00 x 3,965.91 feet
Total Estimated City's Cost

229T«42.05

....$2,002,784.55
$2,002,784.55
872,405r2e

T O T A L E S T I M A T E D COST O F T H E P R O J E C T

$2,875,189.75

All other necessary things shall be done to complete the whole project in a proper and workmanlike manner according to plans, profiles
and specifications on file in the office of the Salt L a k e City Engineer
and to defray the Abutter's Portion of the cost and expense of said improvements by a Special Tax or assessment to be paid in ten (10)
eaual annual installments, plus seven percent (7%) interest on the
unpaid balance levied according to the front or linear foot frontage
upon and against all lots, pieces or parcels of land to be benefited and
affected by said improvements. The whole amount of the tax may be
paid without interest within fifteen (15) days after notice by the Salt
Lake City Treasurer of the amount due.
The abutter's estimated cost per front foot does not include the
extra costs resulting from structural slabs at underground vaults; the
cost of which will vary according to the area to be covered. These
costs are estimated to be approximately $15.00 per square foot of the
structural area. The structural slab extra costs will be assessed against
the properties
benefited in addition to the assessment at
the
aforementioned rate of cost per front foot of abutting property.
All protests and objections to the carrying out of such intention
must be presented in writing, stating therein, lot, block or description of
property, together with the number of front feet to the City Recorder
on or before the 16th day of January, 1974. The Board of Commissioners at its first regular meeting thereafter, to-wit, the 17th day of January, 1974, will consider the proposed levy and hear and consider such
protests and objections to said improvements as have been made.

BY ORDER OF T H E BOARD OF
L A K E CITY, UTAH.
Dated this 18th day of December, 1973.
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